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1 Introduction
It can be theoretically shown that the variety trade between two countries can be
a possible source of an increase in the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled
workers the skill premium in both countries.1 Kurokawa (2008), for example, pro-
poses a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the possibility of an increase in skill
premium in each of the trading countries as a result of variety trade. Upon appli-
cation of the well-known variety-trade models (Krugman, 1979; Dixit and Norman,
1980; Ethier, 1982), he shows that the intra-industry trade in di¤erentiated interme-
diate goods increases the variety of intermediate goods used by the nal good in both
countries. The increased variety of inputs then can mean an increase in the variety
of tasks to be handled and thus correspond to a higher demand for the high-skilled
labor. Through this variety-skill complementarity, the relative wage of high skill the
skill premium can rise in both countries.2
A serious empirical challenge, however, is imposed because no past studies have
empirically quantied how much of the increase in skill premium can be accounted
for by the increase in variety trade. This paper now formulates a static general
equilibrium model and then calibrates it to Mexican data for 1987. In the calibrated
model, our numerical experiments show how much of the increase in Mexican skill
premium from 1987 to 2000 can be explained by the increase in U.S.-Mexican variety
trade.3
We rst present our theoretical model. The model is a static general equilibrium
model which allows us to perform a full-scale calibration.4 There are two countries
and three sectors primaries, manufactures, and services. While primaries and ser-
vices are produced under constant returns and perfect competition, manufactures are
di¤erentiated goods produced under increasing returns and monopolistic competition.
1There are other trade-based explanations for an increase in skill premium in each of the trading
countries. One explanation is based on outsourcing (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996). Another expla-
nation is based on the Schumpeterian mechanism (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999; Acemoglu,
2003).
2Dinopoulos et al. (2002) also link intra-industry trade to wage inequality. Their model, however,
modies the standard one-sector variety-trade model by introducing quasi-homothetic preferences for
varieties and non-homothetic technology in the production of each variety, thus relating an increase
in the output of each variety to an increase in the relative demand for high-skilled labor by each
variety.
3Due to data constraint, here we use data from 1987 to 2000. Fortunately, however, Mexico
acceded to the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and agreed to a major
liberalization of bilateral trade relations with the U.S. in 1987.
4Our model extends Bergoeing and Kehoes (2003) model by distinguishing high- and low-skilled
labor and introducing tari¤s on the imports of manufactured varieties, thus relating an increase in
variety trade due to a tari¤ reduction into an increase in skill premium.
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The production of each good uses high- and low-skilled workers, primaries, services,
and a variety of manufactures. Primaries and manufactures are tradable goods, while
services are non-tradable goods. In each country, a representative consumer with
homothetic preferences consumes these primaries, manufactures, and services. While
our model specication is very general, in this paper, we are interested in assessing
the impact of the U.S.-Mexican variety trade on the skill premium in Mexico a small
country relative to the U.S. Thus, for our numerical analysis, we specialize the model
to the small open economy case.
We calibrate our theoretical model to the Mexican input-output matrix for 1987.
In the calibrated model, we conduct numerical experiments to see how much of the
increase in skill premium in Mexico from 1987 to 2000 can be explained by the in-
crease in U.S.-Mexican variety trade. For this purpose, we consider two alternative
plausible experiments. In one experiment, we assume that trade liberalization in
Mexico over 1987-2000 resulted in a lower tari¤ and thus reduced the price of foreign
varieties in Mexico but the number of imported varieties remained unchanged. In the
other experiment, we assume that the increase in manufactured imports in Mexico
was accompanied by an increase in the number of varieties but the tari¤ remained
unchanged.
Both of the experiments show that the relative wage of high- to low-skilled labor
can increase by approximately 4 percent. On the other hand, the data show that
Mexican skill premium increased from 1.666 to 2.208 over 1987-2000, which is a 32.5
percent increase.5 Thus the results indicate that increased U.S.-Mexican variety trade
can account for approximately 12 percent of the change in Mexican skill premium over
1987-2000.6 Hence, we illustrate the possibility that the U.S.-Mexican variety trade,
which is a small fraction of Mexican GDP, is a factor contributing to the increase
in wage inequality in Mexico; however, it appears not to be the major cause. It
should be noted that here we look at Mexican trade with the U.S. alone. Our results,
5Here we use non-production and production workers as an index for high-skilled and low-skilled
workers (Berman et al., 1994; Robertson, 2004). We calculate the Mexican relative wage on the basis
of the Mexican Monthly Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial Mensual, or EIM) by rst calculating
the monthly income per person of non-production relative to production labor. The annual average
is then produced by averaging this monthly relative wage.
6Note that, as we work with a structural model, our empirical analysis of trade and skill pre-
mium avoids the pitfalls that Deardor¤ and Hakura (1994) point out. Since both trade and wages
are endogenous variables, it is not meaningful to ask if trade causes skill premium to rise. They
thus formulate questions for empirical analysis that are theoretically meaningful. Among them, two
questions are (1) what would be or would have been the wage e¤ects of a particular trade liberaliza-
tion; and (2) what are the wage e¤ects in one country for a particular change such as a productivity
improvement in another country, these e¤ects presumably being transmitted through trade. Our
two experiments ask precisely these two questions posed by Deardor¤ and Hakura.
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however, would be little changed even if Mexican trade with other trade partners of
Mexico is also included. This is because Mexicos principal trade partner is by far
the U.S., which in 2000 supplied approximately 73 percent of Mexicos imports and
attracted approximately 89 percent of its exports.7
Of course, other mechanisms which can explain the increase in skill premium have
also been proposed and empirically tested. One set of studies highlight the inuence
of technological change on skill premium. Berman et al. (1994) argue that skill-biased
technological change caused the shift in demand away from low-skilled and toward
high-skilled labor in U.S. manufacturing during the 1980s. Their regression results
show that 40 percent of this shift can be accounted for by skill-biased technological
change.8 Krusell et al. (2000) argue that a sharp decline in equipment prices in the
1980s led to an increase in the demand for high-skilled workers, who were complements
for this equipment, and a decline in the demand for low-skilled workers, who were
substitutes. They nd, using a calibrated model, that most of the wage inequality shift
of the last 30 years in the U.S. can be explained by this capital-skill complementarity
hypothesis.9
Another set of studies concentrate on the e¤ect of trade on rising skill premium
as does our paper. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) claim that foreign direct investment
shifts production activities from the North to the South an endogenous transfer
of technology and thus increases the Norths outsourcing of the low-skill intensive
goods to the South, but these goods are high-skill intensive goods by the standards
of the South. Thus, the skill intensity of production rises in both the North and the
South. While trade-based explanations have often been criticized due to the small
volume of trade (Krugman, 1995), their regression results indicate that 15-33 percent
of shifts towards high-skilled workers within U.S. manufacturing industries during the
period 1979-1985 can be explained by the increasing import share.10 Zhu and Treer
(2005) demonstrate that the product shifting highlighted by Feenstra and Hanson,
7In 2000, Canada was the second largest destination for Mexican products, accounting for ap-
proximately 2 percent of exports. Outside the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
no individual country absorbed more than 1 percent of total Mexican exports.
8Katz and Murphy (1992), Katz and Autor (1999), and Berman et al. (1998) also relate techno-
logical change to wage inequality.
9The hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity was rst formalized by Griliches (1969). Goldin
and Katz (1998) document the importance of capital-skill complementarity during the period 1909-
1929. Lindquist (2001) has recently replicated the research by Krusell et al. (2000) for Sweden.
10It should be noted that Krugman (2008) argues that, due to the increase in U.S. trade with poor
countries and the growing fragmentation of production, it is no longer safe to assume that the e¤ect
of trade on wage inequality is very minor, although he admits that it is hard to prove the actual
e¤ect.
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which leads to a rise in wage inequality, can also result from technological catch-up
in the South.11
On a di¤erent note, Hanson and Harrison (1999) link the increase in Mexican
wage inequality over the period 1984-1990 to changes in trade policy. They nd,
using regressions, that the reduction in tari¤ protection in 1985 disproportionately
a¤ected low-skilled industries and that the goods from this sector may have fallen
in price and wage because of competition from economies with reserves of cheaper
low-skilled labor than Mexicos.12 In contrast, using numerical simulations, Atolia
(2007) shows that the rise in wage inequality in Latin America can be rationalized as
a short-run response to trade liberalization. In particular, he shows a short-run rise in
wage inequality, despite a long-run decline, can occur due to asymmetries in the speed
of adjustment in di¤erent sectors and capital-skill complementarity in production.13
In this line of empirical studies, our paper adds a new quantitative result using a
di¤erent methodology. To our knowledge, this paper is the rst to use a calibrated
general equilibrium model to show how much of the increase in Mexican skill premium
can be accounted for by trade.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate our
static general equilibrium model of trade. We solve the model in Section 3. Section
4 calibrates the model to the Mexican input-output matrix for 1987. Using the
calibrated model, we present our numerical experiments in Section 5. Finally, Section
6 summarizes main results and mentions future research.
2 The Model
Consider a world in which there are two countries: country 1 and country 2. In
each country j, j = 1; 2, there are three types of goods, a primary good that is
tradable and homogeneous, varieties of a manufactured good that are tradable and
di¤erentiated by the rm that produces them, and a service good that is homogeneous
11Xu (2003) extends Feenstra and Hanson (1996) by introducing endogenously determined non-
traded goods, thus showing that trade liberalization in the South can reduce wage inequality when
trade barriers start at a high level. Many papers relate trade to wage inequality in the U.S. Borjas
and Ramey (1994) show how trade volumes can be linked to wage inequality in the U.S. Harrigan
and Balaban (1999) estimate an econometric general equilibrium model of U.S. wages as a function
of prices, technology, and factor supplies.
12There are many papers focusing on Mexico. Revenga (1997) also relates changes in Mexican
wage inequality to changes in trade policy. Robertson (2004) investigates the link between relative
goods prices and relative wages in Mexico, and Verhoogen (2008) links quality upgrading for export
to skill premium in Mexico.
13See also Robbins (1996) for discussions on increased skill premium in Latin America.
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and non-tradable. The varieties of the manufactured good are combined to produce a
composite manufactured good. Each country j has a given endowment of high-skilled
labor and low-skilled labor, Hj and Lj.
A representative consumer in country j solves the problem of maximizing
p log c
j
p + m log c
j
m + s log c
j
s; (1)
subject to
qjpc
j
p + q
j
mc
j
m + q
j
sc
j
s  wjHHj + wjLLj (2)
cjp; c
j
m; c
j
s  0:
Here cjp is the consumption of the primary good and q
j
p is its price; c
j
m is the consump-
tion of the composite manufactured good and qjm is its price; c
j
s is the consumption
of the service good and qjs is its price; and w
j
H and w
j
L are the wages for the high-
and the low-skilled labor. The composite manufactured goods is a CES aggregate of
di¤erent varieties given by
cjm =
Z
Dw
(cjmz)
dz
 1

; (3)
where parameter ;  < 1; governs the elasticity of substitution, 1= (1  ), between
any two di¤erentiated varieties in the interval Dw = [0; dw] of the varieties of the
manufactured good produced throughout the world. On the other hand, note that
the elasticity of substitution between primaries, services, and composite manufactures
is 1.
Both the primary and the service good in country j are produced according to
constant returns production functions
yjp = p
h
ap

bp(x
j
m;p)
" + (1  bp) (Hjp)"
	
" + (1  ap) (Ljp)
ip1

(xjp;p)
p2(xjs;p)
p3 ;(4)
yjs = s
h
as

bs(x
j
m;s)
" + (1  bs) (Hjs )"
	
" + (1  as) (Ljs)
is1

(xjp;s)
s2(xjs;s)
s3 ;(5)
where 0 < ai; bi < 1; i > 0; and 0 < ik < 1 are sector-specic parameters with
i1 + i2 + i3 = 1; and the composite manufactured inputs are
xjm;p =
Z
Dw
xjmz;p
dz
 1

and xjm;s =
Z
Dw
xmz;s
dz
 1

: (6)
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In contrast, the technology for producing manufactured goods exhibits increasing
returns to scale because of the presence of xed costs. Specically, every rm z;
z 2 Dw, has the production function
yjmz = max
8<:m
"
am

bm(x
j
m;mz)
" + (1  bm) (Hjmz)"
	
" +
(1  am) (Ljmz)
#m1

(xjp;mz)
m2(xjs;mz)
m3   F; 0
9=; ;
(7)
where as in other sectors 0 < am; bm < 1; m > 0; 0 < mk < 1; and m1+m2+m3 =
1: Also,
xjm;mz =
Z
Dw
 
xjmz0;mz

dz0
 1

; (8)
and F > 0 is the level of xed costs.
Thus, in each sector, production requires primaries, services, and a composite
good as inputs. The composite input is produced by combining the manufactured
good, high-skilled labor, and low-skilled labor using a nested-CES technology. The
substitution parameters of this technology, " and , are the same across all sectors.
Further, we assume " <  and dene this as the case where the varieties or manu-
factured goods are relatively more complementary to the high-skilled labor than the
low-skilled labor (variety-skill complementarity).14
Let ~cjmz(q
j
m; w
j
H ; w
j
L; q
j
p; q
j
s; ymz+F ) be the solution to the cost minimization prob-
lem for rm z: As the manufacturing sector produces output using a nested-CES
technology with primaries, services, and a composite input made from manufactured
good, high-skilled labor, and low-skilled labor as inputs, the cost function can be
written in terms of the sub-cost functions as follows:
~cjmz
 
qjm; w
j
H ; w
j
L; q
j
p; q
j
s; ymz + F

= ~cjmz
 
~cjA;m
 
qjm; w
j
H ; w
j
L

; qjp; q
j
s; ymz + F

;
= ~cjmz
 
~cjA;m
 
~cjB;m
 
qjm; w
j
H

; wjL

; qjp; q
j
s; ymz + F

;
=
1
m
 
~cjA;m
i1
!i1 
qp
i2
i2  qs
i3
i3
(ymz + F ) ;(9)
14Kurokawa (2008) formalizes the hypothesis of variety-skill complementarity. In some papers, the
number of inputs plays a related role. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) dene the index of complexity
which relates the increased number of inputs to more complexity in production processes. Kremer
(1993) shows that higher skill workers will use more complex technologies that incorporate more
tasks.
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where z 2 Dj; j = 1; 2; and the sub-cost functions are
~cjA;mz
 
qjm; w
j
H ; w
j
L

=

a
1
1 
m ~c
j
B;mz
 
qjm; w
j
H
  
1  + (1  am)
1
1 
 
wjL
  
1 
  1 

;(10)
~cjB;mz
 
qjm; w
j
H

=

b
1
1 "
m
 
qjm
  "
1 " + (1  bm)
1
1 "
 
wjH
  "
1 "
  1 "
"
: (11)
Thus, we can write ~cjmz (:) as a linear function of ymz + F :
~cjmz
 
qjm; w
j
H ; w
j
L; q
j
p; q
j
s; ymz + F

= Gj (ymz + F ) ; z 2 Dj; j = 1; 2: (12)
The rms in the manufacturing sector are monopolistic competitors and face a
downward sloping demand curve and rm z 2 Dw in country j sets its price qjmz to
maximize prots:
maxjmz = q
j
mzymz  Gj (ymz + F ) ; (13)
taking all other prices as given.
To derive the demand for each variety, assume each country j levies an iceberg
tari¤  j on the imports of the manufactured goods from country  j. Then, the
demand by the consumer in country j for the domestic variety z 2 Dj and the foreign
variety z 2 D j is:
cjmz =

qjmz
qjm
  1
1  m
 
wjHH
j + wjLL
j

qjm
; z 2 Dj; (14)
cjmz =

(1 +  j) q jmz
qjm
  1
1  m
 
wjHH
j + wjLL
j

qjm
; z 2 D j; (15)
where qjmz is the price in country j of variety z 2 Dj and q jmz the price in country j of
variety z 2 D j. One can show that qjm can be written as an exact consumption-based
price index of the prices of individual varieties as follows:
qjm =
Z
Dj
(qjmz)
  
1 dz +
Z
D j
[
 
1 +  j

q jmz]
  
1 dz
  1 

: (16)
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Thus, the total consumption demand for variety z 2 Dj faced by the rm is:
cjmz +
 
1 +  j

c jmz =

qjmz
qjm
  1
1  m
 
wjHH
j + wjLL
j

qjm
+
 
1 +  j
(1 +  j) qjmz
q jm
  1
1  m
 
w jH H
 j + w jL L
 j
q jm
= Eq
  1
1 
mz ; z 2 Dj; j = 1; 2; (17)
where
E =
m
 
wjHH
j + wjLL
j

(qjm)
  
1 
+
m
 
w jH H
 j + w jL L
 j
(q jm = (1 +  j)) 

1 
: (18)
Thus, the total consumption demand varies with price qjmz with elasticity  1= (1  ).
One can show that the same holds true for the total demand for variety z which can
be expressed as
ymz = Tq
  1
1 
mz ; z 2 Dj; j = 1; 2; (19)
for some constant T > 0:
Hence, given the number of varieties, the prot of rm z can be rewritten as:
jz = q
j
mzTq
  1
1 
mz  GjTq 
1
1 
mz  GjF: (20)
The rst order condition for prot maximization with respect to qmz then gives:
qmz =
Gj

; z 2 Dj; j = 1; 2: (21)
Further, by the zero prot condition for this qmz:
jz =
Gj

ymz  Gj (ymz + F ) = 0; (22)
we obtain
yjmz =

1  F; z 2 D
w: (23)
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a vector of prices qjp, q
j
s, q
j
mz, w
j
H ; w
j
L; and quanti-
ties cjp; c
j
s; c
j
mz; y
j
p; y
j
s; y
j
mz; x
j
mz;p; x
j
p;p; x
j
s;p; H
j
p ; L
j
p; x
j
mz;s; x
j
p;s; x
j
s;s; H
j
s ; L
j
s; x
j
mz;mz;
xjp;mz; x
j
s;mz; H
j
mz; L
j
mz; z 2 Dj; j = 1; 2; an interval Dw, and a measure of rms
for each country Dj; j = 1; 2; such that
1. Given the prices, the consumption plans cjp; c
j
mz; c
j
s solve the utility maximization
9
problem of consumer j;
2. Given factor prices, the production plans (including the factor demands) for the
primary and service good satisfy the conditions for zero prot and cost mini-
mization;
3. Given factor prices and demand, price qjmz and production plans (including the
factor demands) of the manufacturing rm z in country j maximize prots and
minimize costs;
4. Every rm z 2 Dw earns zero prots;
5. The markets for goods clear,
P2
j=1

cjp + x
j
p;p + x
j
p;s +
Z
Dj
xjp;mzdz

=
P2
j=1 y
j
p; (24)
cjs + x
j
s;p + x
j
s;s +
Z
Dj
xjs;mzdz = y
j
s; j = 1; 2; (25)"
cjmz + x
j
mz;p + x
j
mz;s +
R
Dj
xjmz0;mzdz
0+
(1 +  j)
 
c jmz + x
 j
mz;p + x
 j
mz;s +
R
D j x
j
mz0;mzdz
0
#
= yjmz; j = 1; 2;(26)
6. The factor markets clear,
Hjp +
Z
Dj
Hjmzdz +H
j
s = H
j; j = 1; 2; (27)
Ljp +
Z
Dj
Ljmzdz + L
j
s = L
j; j = 1; 2; (28)
7. The number of available varieties for consumption is the number of varieties
produced,
Dw = D1 [D2:
3 Solving the Model
In the previous section, we have laid out the model in the two-country setting. We,
however, are interested in assessing the impact of the U.S.-Mexican variety trade
on the skill premium in Mexico a small country relative to the U.S. Thus, in our
simulations, we will concentrate on the small open economy case. Therefore, we will
omit country superscripts from this section onwards. To solve the model, we begin
with the consumers problem.
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3.1 Consumption
With the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the consumers optimal decision is to spend
a constant fraction i of his income on good i = p;m; s. Thus utility maximization
yields the following demand functions for the consumption of the di¤erent goods:
ci (qi; E) =
iE
qi
; i = p;m; s; (29)
where E is the total consumption expenditure and qi is the price of good i. From (2),
we have that the consumption expenditure equals the wage income. However, with
a eye on calibration to data wherein a country may not have the balanced current
account, we allow for net exports (NX) and E to be given by
E = wHH + wLL NX: (30)
Accordingly, in the demand for each individual manufacturing variety in (14  15) ;
wHH + wLL is replaced by E.
3.2 Production
Turning to the production, we start with the primary and service sectors. Similar to
(9), we can write the cost functions for the primary and service sectors as
~ci (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs; yi) = ~ci (~cA;i (qm; wH ; wL) ; qp; qs; yi)
= ~ci (~cA;i (~cB;i (qm; wH) ; wL) ; qp; qs; yi)
=
1
i

~cA;i (qm; wH ; wL)
i1
i1  qp
i2
i2  qs
i3
i3
yi;(31)
where
~cA;i (qm; wH ; wL) =

a
1
1 
i ~cB;i (qm; wH)
  
1  + (1  ai)
1
1  w
  
1 
L
  1 

;
~cB;i (qm; wH) =

b
1
1 "
i q
  "
1 "
m + (1  bi)
1
1 " w
  "
1 "
H
  1 "
"
; (32)
and, i = p; s:
Using these cost functions, it is easy to derive the input demands using Shephards
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lemma. For example, the demand of primaries is
xp;i (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs; yi) =
@~ci
@qp
=
i2~ci
qp
; i = p; s; (33)
xp;mz (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs; ymz + F ) =
@~cmz
@qp
=
m2~cmz
qp
; (34)
where the numerator is the factor payment to the primaries for the relevant good or
variety, and the demand for service input is
xs;i (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs; yi) =
@~ci
@qs
=
i3~ci
qs
; i = p; s; (35)
xs;mz (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs; ymz + F ) =
@~cmz
@qs
=
m3~cmz
qs
; (36)
Similarly, we can derive the demand for low-skilled labor (Li (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs; yi))
and high-skilled labor (Hi (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs; yi)) and the composite manufactured
input (xm;i (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs; yi)) by di¤erentiating the cost function with respect to
wL, wH , and qm. Finally, the input demand for a particular variety z of manufactures
is
xmz;i =

qmz
qm
  1
1 
xm;i; i = p; s; (37)
xmz;mz =

qmz
qm
  1
1 
xm;mz: (38)
The condition for prot maximization by the rms producing manufactured vari-
eties has already been derived (see (21)).15 Prot maximization by rms implies that
in the primary and service sectors, price equals marginal cost which also equals the
unit cost
qi =
1
i

~cA;i (qm; wH ; wL)
i1
i1  qp
i2
i2  qs
i3
i3
; i = p; s: (39)
3.3 Production and Use of Manufactures
The maximization problem for a rm manufacturing a particular variety has already
been solved in Section 2. We now proceed to further derive the aggregate variables
for the manufacturing sector or good. For this we begin by imposing symmetry in
15Even though the country is small, every rm producing a variety z of manufactured good
possesses marketing power and faces same elasticity of demand in domestic and foreign markets. So,
equation (21) still applies.
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the manufacturing sector so that the price of all domestic varieties and hence their
quantities produced as well as domestically used are all the same. Similarly, the price
and quantities used of the imported varieties are the same as well.
Let n be the number of domestic varieties and n be the number of foreign vari-
eties. Further, let xmz be the quantity of a representative variety that is domestically
used and similarly dene xmz. Then we can write the price (qm) of the compos-
ite manufactured good that is used in production and for consumption as a use- or
consumption-based price index
qm =
h
nq
  
1 
mz + n
[(1 + )qmz ]
  
1 
i  1 

: (40)
It is instructive to rewrite this index as a combination of the price indices for the
domestic and foreign varieties
qm =
h
q
  
1 
mz + q
  
1 
mz
i  1 

; (41)
where
qmz = n
  1 
 qmz; (42)
is the price index for the domestically produced varieties and
qmz = (n
) 
1 
 (1 + )qmz (43)
is the price index for the foreign produced varieties. The corresponding quantity
indices for their use in the domestic economy are
xmz = n
1
xmz; (44)
xmz = (n
)
1
 xmz : (45)
4 Calibration of the Model
We test the ability of the model to explain the rise in skill premium in Mexico over the
period 1987-2000. The choice of 1987 comes from data constraint. However, this is
not a serious limitation since Mexico acceded to the GATT only in 1986 and agreed to
a major liberalization of bilateral trade relations with the U.S. in 1987. Accordingly,
the model is calibrated to the input-output matrix for Mexico for the year 1987.
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4.1 Data
The input-output matrix for Mexico for 1987 is given in Appendix A. This matrix
contains the information on the factor costs in each sector (Xj;i) where i stands for
sector and j stands for the factor; the value of output for each sector, Yi; the value of
exports and imports for each sector, EXi and IMi; and the value of consumption of
each good, Ci. All of the steps to construct this input-output matrix and the sources
of the data are shown in Appendix A. Note that we do not have data on the break-up
of the cost share of labor between low-skilled and high-skilled labor for the primary
and service sectors for Mexico. In the benchmark simulations, we assume the share
to be the same as in the manufacturing sector. In an alternative scenario, we use the
break-up for Chile for 1992.
As shown in the matrix, much of output is services which are non-traded, and
trade is not balanced in the data. We can also see that the gross value added in each
sector equals its factor payments
Yi =
P
j Xj;i; i = p;m; s; (46)
and that the total use of each good equals its net supply
P
kXi;k + Ci = Yi + IMi   EXi i = p;m; s: (47)
4.2 Calibration
We begin our calibration by choosing the values of the three substitution parameters
in the model, , , and ". The parameter  governs the elasticity of substitution
among manufactured varieties. Recall that the elasticity of substitution between the
primaries, the services, and the manufactures is already set to 1. The value of 
determines the markup over cost charged by the rm. We set  = 5=6 which yields a
20 percent markup. This is in accordance with evidence in OECD countries presented
by Martins et al. (1996).
Parameters  and " set the elasticity of substitution between the manufactures and
low-skilled labor and between the manufactures and high-skilled labor, respectively.
A number of studies report evidence in favor of capital-skill complementarity.16 As
Krusell et al. (2000) document, the majority of the estimates for the elasticity of
substitution between low-skilled labor and capital lie between 0.5 and 3 whereas
16For example, see Griliches (1969), Berndt and Christensen (1974), Fallon and Layard (1975),
and Brown and Christensen (1981).
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most estimates of the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled labor and capital
are below 1.2, and as they note, several are near zero. In accordance with this
evidence, we choose the elasticity of substitution for low-skilled labor to be 2 and for
high-skilled labor to be 0.5 in the benchmark case. This implies  = 1=2 and " =  1.
We begin the calibration by setting
E = Cp + Cm + Cs: (48)
Further, given that there are productivity parameters in the production functions, we
can only normalize all domestic goods prices to 1, i.e., we set
qp = qm = qs = 1: (49)
Further, we can also independently set the wage rates. Hence, without loss of gener-
ality, let17
wL = wH = 1: (50)
The calculation of 0s is straightforward in our case
i =
Ci
E
; i = p; s;m: (51)
For factor j, dene the cost share of that factor in sector i as j;i and denote by
wj the price of factor j = p; s;m; L;H.18 Then, from the demand functions derived
above, we get
j;i (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs) =
wjxj;i (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs)
~ci (qm; wH ; wL; qp; qs)
: (52)
Then, b0is can be solved from the following equations
m;i
H;i
=
Xm;i
XH;i
; i = p; s;mz: (53)
Each of these equations has only one unknown, bi. Note that here we are using the
fact that
Xm;mz
XH;mz
=
Xm;m
XH;m
: (54)
17It does not matter how big wH is in relation to wL.
18For example, wm = qm, wp = qp; and ws = qs.
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Similarly, a0is solve the following equations
m;i + H;i
L;i
=
Xm;i +XH;i
XL;i
; i = p; s;mz: (55)
Recall, as we do not have data on the break-up of the cost share of labor between low-
skilled and high-skilled labor for the primary and service sectors, in the benchmark
calibration we set H;i=L;i = H;m=L;m; i = p; s.
The 0is are easy to calculate as well
i1 =
Xm;i +XH;i +XL;i
Yi
; i = p; s;mz; (56)
i2 =
Xp;i
Yi
; i = p; s;mz; (57)
i3 =
Xs;i
Yi
; i = p; s;mz: (58)
With all goods prices (qp; qm; qs) and factor prices (wH ; wL) normalized to 1, factor
costs equal factor demands, and it is easy to calibrate p and s by using the produc-
tion functions (4  5) in which the only remaining unknown is i. Furthermore, by
labor market clearing, the supply of low-skilled and high-skilled labor is simply equal
to the factor payments of each labor.
L =
P
i=p;m;sXL;i; (59)
H =
P
i=p;m;sXH;i: (60)
4.2.1 Remaining Calibration
To complete the calibration we still need to nd values for
qmz; (1 + )qmz ; m; n; n
; xmz; xmz : (61)
We begin with the composite of the domestic traded varieties which can be expressed
as
xmz =
Ym   EXm
qmz
=
Ym   EXm
n 
1 
 qmz
; (62)
which in turn yields19
xmz =
xmz
n
1

=
Ym   EXm
nqmz
: (63)
19We could have obtained this directly using symmetry.
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Similarly,
xmz =
xmz
(n)
1

=
IMm
n(1 + )qmz
(64)
Since varieties are aggregated using a CES aggregator, it is easy to see from
(14  15) or (37  38) that the relative demand for the domestic and foreign varieties
is
xmz
xmz
=

qmz
(1 + )qmz
  1
1 
: (65)
Further, from the price index of the manufactured good (40), we have
qm =
h
nq
  
1 
mz + n
[(1 + )qmz ]
  
1 
i  1 

; (66)
which can be simplied using (65). For this, we use (65) to obtain
nqmzxmz
n(1 + )qmzxmz
=
n
n

qmz
(1 + )qmz
  
1 
=
Ym   EXm
IMm
; (67)
which can be used to write (66) as
qm = (n
) 
1 
 (1 + )qmz
"(
n
n

qmz
(1 + )qmz
  
1 
)
+ 1
#  1 

= (n) 
1 
 (1 + )qmz

Ym   EXm
IMm
+ 1
  1 

: (68)
Finally, we impose the normalization
n+ n = 100; (69)
and obtain the ratio of varieties produced in Mexico and the U.S.
n
n
(70)
using the employment data. It can be shown that the ratio n=n equals the ratio
of the total labor compensations in the Mexican and U.S. manufactures, which is
approximately 3=97 in 1987.
It is possible to solve (21), (63  65) ; and (68  70) for qmz; (1 + )qmz ; m; n;
n; xmz; and xmz. In order to complete the calibration of the model, we check the
calibration by ensuring that all markets actually clear. The resulting calibration of
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the model is summarized in Table 1, and Table 2 lists the initial steady state values
of the endogenous variables.
5 Variety Trade and Skill Premium
We have calibrated the static general equilibrium model to the Mexican economy.
In the calibrated model, we quantitatively evaluate the ability of the variety-skill
complementarity hypothesis to explain the rise in skill premium in Mexico over the
period 1987-2000. To do so, we change the manufactured trade in the calibrated
model as in the Mexican data from 1987 to 2000. Over this period, both the ratio of
manufactured imports from the U.S. to GDP and the ratio of manufactured exports
to the U.S. to GDP increased by over 100 percent.
There are two plausible exogenous changes that could have led to this increase
in imports: reduction of trade barriers () by Mexico or production of the increased
number of varieties (n) in the U.S. We, therefore, consider two alternative plausible
experiments that are consistent with the suggestions of Deardor¤ and Hakura (1994).
In Experiment 1, the increase in manufactured imports arises solely from reduced
trade barriers that we interpret as a reduction in a tari¤. In Experiment 2, this
increase is assumed to come entirely from an increase in the number of varieties being
imported. In either case, we capture the change in availability of domestic varieties
by letting their exports change as in the data.
While the reality perhaps lies somewhere in the middle, our simulations show that
the e¤ect of increased manufactured trade on skill premium is the same irrespective
of the cause. In fact, the economys equilibrium is the same in the two cases, except
for the number of imported varieties and their price.
Before presenting the results, here we briey sketch the procedure for solving for
the new equilibrium. To obtain the new values of [(1+)q0mz ]; q
0
mz, n
0, q0s, q
0
m, w
0
H , w
0
L,
y0p, and y
0
s, we solve zero prot conditions (39) for the primary and the service sectors;
the prot maximization condition (21) for a representative domestic manufactured
variety; the price index (66) for the domestic composite manufactured good, qm;
market clearing conditions (59  60) for the two types of labor; the market clearing
condition for the non-traded service good (25); the consumers budget constraint (30);
and the market clearing condition for the representative foreign variety (26) :20 In the
consumers budget constraints, total net exports adjust freely in the new equilibrium,
20This condition (26) is used to choose (1 + )qmz to match the manufactured imports/GDP
ratio.
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but the net exports of manufactures is at its value in the Mexican data for 2000 which
is 20.98 percent of GDP. This is because both the manufactured imports/GDP ratio
and the manufactured exports/GDP ratio increase as do the data.
5.1 Experiment 1 - Tari¤Reduction and Skill Premium
In this experiment, as mentioned above, the rise in manufactured imports comes
from reduced trade barriers. We estimate the reduction of trade barriers in Mexico
by changing (1 + )qmz so that both the ratio of manufactured imports from the
U.S. to GDP and the ratio of manufactured exports to the U.S. to GDP increase as
do the Mexican data over 1987-2000. In particular, in our experiment, we increase
these ratios by 103.4 percent (from 8.8 percent in 1987 to 17.9 percent in 2000) and
by 114.3 percent (from 9.8 percent in 1987 to 20.98 percent in 2000), respectively.
The calibration yields a decrease in (1 + )qmz from 3.6483 to 2.9600. Assuming an
initial tari¤ rate of 25 percent, this is equivalent to reducing the tari¤ to 1.42 percent
as shown in Table 2 for the new equilibrium in Experiment 1.21
The price of each foreign variety, therefore, falls by approximately 20 percent
in Mexico. In our model, this would increase the quantity of each foreign variety
that is imported. The increased availability of manufactured varieties would raise
the demand for the high-skilled labor relative to that of the low-skilled labor since
the high-skilled labor is more strongly complementary to manufactures than the low-
skilled labor. This, in turn, will lead to the rise in the wage of the high-skilled
labor relative to that of the low-skilled labor. In other words, the lowered price of
imported varieties will lower the price of the composite manufactured input, which in
turn will raise the relative demand of the high-skilled labor through the variety-skill
complementarity mechanism.
This indeed is the case as shown by the new equilibrium for the year 2000 in Table
2. The quantity of each variety imported rises from 34.47 to 87.06. The price index
of the composite manufactured good falls from 1 to 0.9368. As a result, we can see
that the wage of the high-skilled labor increases from 1 to 1.0224 and that of the
low-skilled labor decreases from 1 to 0.9983. Thus the relative wage wH=wL increases
from 1 to 1.0241, which is a 2.41 percent increase. Other changes in the equilibrium
are also worth noting. The change in the domestic production of manufactures occurs
entirely through the change in the number of domestic varieties that are produced.
The output of a domestic variety cannot change. This is an artifact of the facts that
21The price of a foreign variety in Mexico is 3:6483 = (1 + 0:250)2:9186 in 1987 and 2:9600 =
(1 + 0:0142)2:9186 in 2000.
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in the model the markup is constant and the xed costs are xed in units of output
(see (23)). While n does not change in the new equilibrium, n does rise, in this case,
from 3 to 3.1470. Besides the manufacturing sector, the service sector also expands
whereas the primary sector shrinks.
The e¤ect of variety trade on skill premium seems to be small compared to the
data. The data show that the Mexican skill premium increased from 1.666 to 2.208
during the period 1987-2000, which is a 32.5 percent increase. Thus the increased
U.S.-Mexican variety trade accounts for approximately 7.4 percent of the change in
Mexican skill premium over 1987-2000. Yet, we here have illustrated the possibility
that the variety trade can contribute to the increase in wage inequality; however,
it might not be the major cause. It should be noted that here we have looked at
Mexican trade with the U.S. alone. Our results, however, would be little changed
even if Mexican trade with other trade partners of Mexico is also included. This is
because Mexicos principal trade partner is by far the U.S., which in 2000 supplied
approximately 73 percent of Mexicos imports and attracted approximately 89 percent
of its exports.
5.2 Experiment 2 - Increase in Imported Varieties and Skill
Premium
In this experiment, we assume that the increase in manufactured imports in Mexico
was a result of the increase in the number of varieties alone. The increase in the
available number of foreign varieties lowers the price of the composite manufactured
input. Once again, it is anticipated that this lowered price would raise the demand for
the high-skilled labor relative to that of the low-skilled labor as the high-skilled labor
is more strongly complementary to manufactures than the low-skilled labor. This
should then raise the wage of the high-skilled labor relative to that of the low-skilled
labor.
The resulting new equilibrium is shown in Table 2. A look at Table 2 reveals that
the entire equilibrium is the same as for Experiment 1 except that n is now changing
instead of (1 + )qmz. The number of imported varieties rises from 97 to 275.92, an
almost 200 percent increase in the number of varieties. Note that the actual imports
increase only by approximately 100 percent. Thus the quantity of each foreign variety
that is imported actually falls from 34.47 to 24.83.
This is an interesting and important point. When the increased number of varieties
become available, it is optimal to spread existing imports over these varieties to gain
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from the diversity of inputs. However, this also reduces the price of the composite
manufactured input which then increases its usage. This increase in usage tends to
mitigate the fall in quantity of each foreign variety that is imported but does not
completely o¤set it.
As otherwise the equilibrium is unchanged, the interpretation of the results for
Experiment 1 applies in this case as well.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The basic mechanism underlying the variety-skill complementarity hypothesis is the
di¤erence in the relative ease of the substitution of manufactured input and high-
skilled labor versus low-skilled labor. It, therefore, appears that the elasticity of
substitution between manufactured input and high-skilled labor and between man-
ufactured input and low-skilled labor would be important to the quantitative e¤ect
of change in manufactured imports and exports on skill premium. The sensitivity
analysis is thus very important as there is considerable variation in the estimates of
these elasticities in the literature as Krusell et al. (2000) note. These elasticities are
governed by values of " and . Here we do our sensitivity analysis for a variety of
values of " and .
The benchmark numerical experiments in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 have set " =  1
and  = 1=2. This means that the elasticity of substitution between the varieties and
high-skilled labor, 1= (1  "), is 1=2 and that between the varieties and low-skilled
labor, 1= (1  ), is 2. Recall, Krusell et al. (2000) report that the majority of the
estimates for the elasticity of substitution between low-skilled labor and capital lie
between 0.5 and 3. On the other hand, most estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between high-skilled labor and capital are below 1.2, and, as they note, several are
near zero.Accordingly, we do our sensitivity analysis for two sets of value of " and
 so that the two elasticities of substitution take extreme but plausible values. Given
the uncertainty about these elasticities, the sensitivity analysis can test the robustness
of our quantitative results. It can also provide an estimate of the upper bound on the
amount of rise in skill premium in Mexico that can be explained by the Mexican-U.S.
manufactured or variety trade.
Table 3 reports the results of the numerical experiments in which " =  3 and
 = 3=4, that is, the elasticity of substitution between the varieties and high-skilled
labor is 1=4 and that between the varieties and low-skilled labor is 4. Note that these
are plausible values. The rise in skill premium is still small but is much stronger (3.09
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percent) compared to the benchmark case (2.41 percent). We can now explain 9.47
percent of the actual rise in skill premium.
In Table 4, we further increase the di¤erence in the elasticities by letting " =  9
and  = 9=10; the elasticity of substitution between the varieties and high-skilled
labor is 1=10 and that between the varieties and low-skilled labor is 10. As we can
see, the results indicate that the skill premium now increases slightly more (3.29
percent).
Qualitatively, these results are as expected. A more negative value of " (a smaller
elasticity of substitution between the varieties and high-skilled labor) and a greater
value of  (a greater elasticity of substitution between the varieties and low-skilled
labor) are accompanied by a larger increase in skill premium. Quantitatively, however,
all of these increases (2.41, 3.09, and 3.29 percent) do not make a signicant di¤erence
in that they are small compared to the 32.5 percent increase shown in the data. In
fact, it can be shown that in our numerical experiments, the upper bound for the
increase in skill premium is 11-12 percent of the actual increase of 32.5 percent.
However, the choice of elasticities of substitution may make a greater di¤erence when
the rise in skill premium is initially more signicant in the benchmark case.
5.4 Sectoral Variation in Skill Intensity of Employment and
Skill Premium
There is another reason why we have under-estimated the increase in skill premium
due to the increase in variety trade in the previous sections. In the new equilibrium,
manufacturing and service sectors expand at the expense of the primary sector. There
is overwhelming evidence that manufacturing and service production is more skill in-
tensive than the production of primaries (see Atolia, 2007). In fact, recent evidence
in Bussolo et al. (2002) indicates that the service sector is the most skill-intensive
sector followed by the manufacturing.22 The upshot of these facts is that as man-
ufactures and services expand, their resulting resource allocation further raises the
relative demand of high-skilled labor through the Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism.
Due to lack of data on the skill intensity of employment in the primary and
service sectors for Mexico, we have so far assumed the skill intensity to be the same
as in manufacturing. However, as the above discussion shows, this is not an innocuous
22Note, this implies that by assuming the skill intensity of employment to be the same as the man-
ufacturing sector for all sectors, we have not overestimated the overall skill intensity of employment
in the economy. In fact, besides being the most skill-intensive sector, the service sector is also the
biggest, accounting for almost half of the total output of the economy.
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assumption and leads us to under-estimate the e¤ect of variety trade on skill premium.
The only virtue of this assumption is that it does not demand any additional data.
It can, however, be argued that this virtue is also its weakness since it forces us to
ignore evidence available on sectoral di¤erences in skill intensity, albeit from other
similar countries.
To rectify this shortcoming of the previous analysis as well as to check the ro-
bustness of our results, in this subsection we allow sectoral di¤erences in the skill
intensity of employment. In particular, we use the evidence in Bussolo et al. (2002)
on the skill intensity of employment in Chile for 1992.23 They provide the sectoral
break-up of employment into seven categories. We present results for two di¤erent
ways of aggregating these categories into high- and low-skilled employment.
In the rst case, we aggregate workers by their skill level: managers and profes-
sionals, technicians, administrative workers, and skilled blue collar workers comprise
the high-skilled category; commerical and service workers, un-skilled blue collar work-
ers, and informal workers comprise the low-skilled. With this classication, the ratio
of (share of) high-skilled workers in the primary sector to the manufacturing sector is
11/28. The number for the service sector is 32/28. We recalibrate the model taking
these sectoral skill intensity variations into account.
In the recalibrated model, the change is that variety trade over 1987-2000 gives
rise to a 2.66 percent increase in skill premium for the benchmark value of " and ;
which is 10:4 percent greater than the 2.41 percent change in the absence of sectoral
variations in skill intensity. For the other values of " and  considered in our sensitivity
analysis, the skill premium rises by 3.28 percent and 3.46 percent compared to earlier
increases of 3.09 and 3.29 percent.
In the rst case, the classication of the workers as high- and low-skilled is not
the same across all sectors. We have followed the skill classication of Bussolo et al.
(2002) for the primary and service sectors, whereas for the manufacturing sector, we
have used nonproduction-production classication based on Mexican data. To avoid
this problem, in the second case, we aggregate employment in the primary and service
sectors according to the white and blue collar classication of Bussolo et al. (2002)
which corresponds more closely to the nonproduction-production classication. As a
result, now the ratios of high-skilled workers in primaries and services are 22/48 and
49/48. In the recalibrated model, the skill premium now increases by 2.76 percent,
23Table 2 in their paper summarizes the structural features of the Chilean economy. They report
the shares of gross output, value-added, total demand, trade ows, and employment for 24 sectors
and three aggregate macro-sectors (primary, manufactures and services). These shares are calculated
using the Social Accounting Matrix for Chile in Alonso and Roland-Holst (1995).
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3.38 percent, and 3.54 percent for the three sets of elasticities of substitution, respec-
tively. The last number (3.54 percent) is 10.90 percent of the actual observed rise in
skill premium, and it can be shown that the upper bound of increase is now 12-13
percent of the actual rise, thus indicating that our results obtained in the previous
sections are robust.
6 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper has been to quantitatively evaluate the ability of
the variety-skill complementarity hypothesis to explain the rise in skill premium in
Mexico over the period 1987-2000. The results of our numerical experiments indicate
that the increased U.S.-Mexican variety trade has the capability of accounting for
approximately 12 percent of the change in Mexican skill premium during this period.
Here we have illustrated the possibility that U.S.-Mexican variety trade, which is a
small fraction of Mexican GDP, can contribute to the increase in wage inequality
in Mexico, although it appears not to be the major cause. This is compatible with
past empirical results indicating that trade is not the major cause of increased skill
premium while technological change is.
Thus, using a calibrated general equilibrium model, this paper has been successful
in adding a new quantitative result to the literature. Moreover, we can say that this
papers methodology can be used to derive further empirical implications. First, this
paper has focused on the case where Mexico is a small open economy. We can also
extend our model to a two-country model.
Second, our model can be directly applied to countries other than Mexico. We can
calibrate our model to the input-output data for other countries and then empirically
quantify the e¤ects of variety trade on skill premium in each of them. For example, we
have calibrated our model to the 1985 input-output data for Japan. In the calibrated
model, the benchmark numerical experiment shows that the Japanese skill premium
decreases by 4.77 percent when the manufacturing variety trade with the OECD
countries changes (actually decreases) as in the data over 1985-1995. The data,
however, show that the Japanese skill premium actually increased modestly during
the 1980s and 1990s (Freeman and Katz, 1994). The results thus indicate that other
factors such as technological change must have o¤set the decrease caused by the
manufacturing variety trade in Japan. This provides a possible answer to why the
increase in skill premium was drastic in Mexico but modest in Japan.
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Appendix A - Benchmark 1987 Mexican Data Set
The following is the input-output matrix for 1987 that is used to calibrate the model
to the Mexican economy. All the numbers in the matrix are in millions of U.S.
dollars. The steps following the matrix show the procedure for the construction of
the input-output matrix and the sources of the data.
Primaries Manufactures Services Total
Xp;i 2; 712 13; 485 1; 533 17; 730
Xm;i 2; 836 23; 704 15; 939 42; 479
Xs;i 1; 190 8; 355 14; 874 24; 419
Hi 9; 131 17; 068 37; 414 63; 613
Li 10; 756 20; 106 44; 075 74; 937
Yi 26; 625 82; 718 113; 835 223; 179
Ci 4; 643 38; 793 89; 416 132; 853
NXi 4; 252 1; 446 0 5; 698
EXi 6; 626 13; 643
IMi 2; 374 12; 197
Step 1. Intermediate input and total production. This 1987 matrix is constructed
from the 1980 input-output table provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica Geografía e Informática (INEGI) .
Step 2. Labor compensation. Yi   Xp;i   Xm;i   Xs;i in each sector. The compen-
sation is then distributed into Hi and Li according to the EIM: wHH=wLL =
4185=4930 in 1987.
Step 3. Net exports to the U.S. of primaries and manufactures. Source: The Inter-
national Trade Administration.
Step 4. Consumption. Get from Yi Ci Xi;p Xi;m Xi;s = NXi. This consumption
C corresponds to c+ i+ g+net exports to the rest of the world except the U.S.
Notes
1. 1 peso = 1000 old pesos.
2. The nominal exchange rate in 1987 = 1.37818 MXP/USD. Source: The Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS).
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Preference parameters
p = 0:035 s = 0:673 m = 0:292
Technology: CES aggregator parameters
bp = 0:088 bs = 0:154 bm = 0:659
ap = 0:569 as = 0:591 am = 0:665
" =  1  = 1
2
 = 5
6
Technology: productivity parameters
p = 3:688 s = 3:697 m = 4:387
Technology: cost shares
p1 = 0:853 p2 = 0:102 p3 = 0:045
s1 = 0:856 s2 = 0:013 s3 = 0:131
m1 = 0:736 m2 = 0:163 m3 = 0:101
Endowments
L = 74936:415 H = 63613:585
Manufactured varieties
F = 4285:095
n = 3 n = 97
qmz = 1:2870 (1 + )qmz = 3:6483
xmz = 17; 892 xmz = 34:47
Table 1: The values of the calibrated parameters of the model.
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Initial equilibrium Experiment 1 Experiment 2
" =  1;  = 1
2
1987 2000 2000
n 3 3.1470 3.1470
n 97 97 275.92
xmz 17,892 14,074 14,074
xmz 34.47 87.06 24.83
qmz 1.2870 1.2682 1.2682
(1 + ) qmz 3.6483 2.9600 3.6483
 0.25 0.0142 0.25
qm 1 0.9368 0.9368
qp 1 1 1
qs 1 0.9973 0.9973
wH 1 1.0224 1.0224
wL 1 0.9983 0.9983
wH=wL 1 1.0241 1.0241
yp 26,625 25,358 25,358
ys 113,835 114,399 114,399
ym 82,718 91,278 91,278
Table 2: The initial equilibrium (1987) with tari¤ (tau) normalized to .25. The new
equilibrium (2000) when tari¤ falls (Experiment 1). The new equilibrium (2000) when
the number of imported varieties increases (Experiment 2).
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Initial equilibrium Experiment 1 Experiment 2
" =  3;  = 3
4
1987 2000 2000
n 3 3.1244 3.1244
n 97 97 276.34
xmz 17,892 14,025 14,025
xmz 34.47 87.07 24.79
qmz 1.2870 1.2686 1.2686
(1 + ) qmz 3.6483 2.9591 3.6483
 0.25 0.01386 0.25
qm 1 0.9378 0.9378
qp 1 1 1
qs 1 0.9974 0.9974
wH 1 1.0258 1.0258
wL 1 0.9951 0.9951
wH=wL 1 1.0309 1.0309
yp 26,625 25,220 25,220
ys 113,835 114,313 114,313
ym 82,718 90,554 90,554
Table 3: The results for the numerical experiment with epsilon = -3 and mu = (3/4).
32
Initial equilibrium Experiment 1 Experiment 2
" =  9;  = 9
10
1987 2000 2000
n 3 3.1328 3.1328
n 97 97 276.29
xmz 17,892 14,043 14,043
xmz 34.47 87.08 24.80
qmz 1.2870 1.2684 1.2684
(1 + ) qmz 3.6483 2.9592 3.6483
 0.25 0.01390 0.25
qm 1 0.9374 0.9374
qp 1 1 1
qs 1 0.9975 0.9975
wH 1 1.0270 1.0270
wL 1 0.9943 0.9943
wH=wL 1 1.0329 1.0329
yp 26,625 25,279 25,279
ys 113,835 114,333 114,333
ym 82,718 90,820 90,820
Table 4: The results for the numerical experiment with epsilon = -9 and mu = (9/10).
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